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Abstract
This study considered how appropriate different market-based approaches are for the
reduction of ship air emissions, particularly CO2. Furthermore, the study also considered which
types of market-based tools may be available for application to the shipping industry. This
project was not intended to design or optimize a system for the maritime community.
The study considered the current input and discussions within the International
Maritime Organization and its Marine Environment Protection Committee and identified three
major thought patterns in proposed systems for the maritime industry: (1) an emissions trading
scheme for the shipping industry, (2) CO2 indexing, and (3) alternative approaches. The most
significant alternative approach is to place a levy on fuel bunkers. Other alternative approaches
could involve hybrid systems using any combination of the other systems mentioned.
The study identified a number of unresolved issues and tradeoffs that could hinder the
implementation of these systems. These industry-specific issues include technical, policy,
administrative, and infrastructure considerations. Currently, there is no consensus on which
type of system to use or even whether any of these systems will be used. The study concludes
with recommended steps towards emissions management for ship owners and operators.
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Executive Summary
The objective of this study was to consider how appropriate different market-based
approaches are for the reduction of ship air emissions, particularly CO2. Furthermore, the study
also considers which types of market-based tools may be available for application to the
shipping industry. This project was not intended to design or optimize a system for the
maritime community. For this study, the author has loosely defined market-based system to
mean a system which implements economic incentives to prompt reduction in air emissions.
The report first reviews the background information and motivation in an abbreviated
manner and has addressed only the information which was considered directly relevant and
prerequisite to understanding the remainder of the report. Subsequently, the study
investigated market-based tools that are used in other industries, existing systems and efforts
in the maritime industry, and proposed systems and ideas for the maritime industry. This
investigation is followed by a discussion of the major unresolved issues for the application of a
market-based system to the shipping industry. The study ends by drawing a number of
conclusions and some steps towards emissions management are suggested in the final chapter
of the report.
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stirred
up discussion of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This eventually led to the Kyoto
Protocol five years later (1997) which was the first time that agreement was reached to actively
work towards reducing GHG emissions. However, the complex and international nature of the
aviation and shipping industries resulted in these two industries being excluded from the
measures taken in the Kyoto Protocol. Simultaneously, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) had been considering environmental issues through its Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC) even though the industry was not yet required to take any formal action.
Most recently, increasing pressure to take action has been placed on the IMO by the European
Union (EU). The EU has indicated that if the IMO does not continue to demonstrate its progress
and implement a system in the near future, the EU tentatively intends to take action between
about 2012 and 2015.
The study has investigated a number of cap and trade systems in use for other
industries. These trade systems place an absolute upper bound on the level of emissions which
is considered to constitute a sustainable operating environment. The total emissions are then
allotted, in smaller units (usually one credit equivalent to one ton of CO2), amongst the emitters
in the system. Participants whose emissions exceed their credits must turn to the market, on
which carbon credits are sold, in order to acquire additional credits. Conversely, participants
who emit less than their allotted credits can sell their additional credits on the market. The EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the largest multi-national example of such a system. It
currently governs the emissions from about 11,000-12,000 land-based emitting sources.
The study also considers two notable efforts within the shipping industry: the Port of
Long Beach/Los Angeles Green Flag Program and the Swedish Maritime Administration's (SMA)
Environmentally-Differentiated Fairway Dues system. The Green Flag Program is a voluntary
speed reduction program in which the port offers reduced dockage rates to carriers who
achieve a certain level of compliance within a defined zone surrounding the port. The program
was also expanded to include a fuel subsidy program to promote the use of low-sulfur fuel in
the waters surrounding the port. The SMA environmentally-differentiated dues systems is a
two part fee structure which assesses an additional fee if fuel with too high a sulfur content is
used, while a reduction in fee is also possible for ships whose NOx emissions are within a
predefined range. Both of these systems have proven successful and have experienced
optimistically-high participation levels within the portion of the shipping community that they
have affected, however; on a fundamental level, these types of systems are not easily scalable
beyond the localized capabilities which they have demonstrated.
Different Approaches
The study considered the current input and discussions within the IMO and MEPC and
identified three major thought patterns in proposed systems for the maritime industry: (1) an
ETS for the shipping industry, (2) CO2 indexing, and (3) alternative approaches. An ETS for the
shipping industry would follow the same fundamental structure as summarized previously, but
would be subject to a number of industry-specific developmental hurdles. Also, while no
system has been decided upon, the supporters of an ETS are leaning towards a closed system
(at least initially) in which the industry interacts only amongst itself. This simplifies some of the
logistical issues, but does not allow ship owners and operators to take full advantage of the
inherent efficiency of cargo movement by ship relative to other transportation modes. CO2
indexing has developed simultaneously alongside the debate between ETS and alternative
approaches. The index quantifies emissions levels on a per ship basis by considering a vessel's
CO2 emissions per transport work. This can be done using design parameters (Energy Efficiency
Design Index - EEDI) or actual operating conditions (Energy Efficiency Operational Index - EEOI).
The IMO has now issued trial guidelines for the design index, and they are currently working to
refine the operational index calculation. The most significant alternative approach is to place a
levy on fuel bunkers. Other alternative approaches could involve hybrid systems using any
combination of the other systems mentioned. The levy on fuel is most heavily backed by ship
owners who justify the system due to its easier implementation and because the revenue
generated could be reinvented in research and development of new technologies. Currently,
there is no consensus on which type of system to use.
Unresolved Issues
A number of conceptual unresolved issues as well as a few critical tradeoffs have been
identified and discussed in this study. Regardless of the type of system that is selected, it will
require dynamic re-evaluation throughout the development process to ensure that the end
result is a meaningful system rather than a merely politically accepted program. The actual
objective of real reduction in CO2 should not be forfeited to a system which looks good on
paper and is politically satisfying. A significant concern for this is the notion of common, but
differentiated responsibility that is being requested (or demanded) by developing countries. As
these countries represent more than 2/3 of the existing world fleet, it is difficult to envision a
useful system without their participation. Generally speaking, any of the proposed system
come coupled with significant infrastructure demands ranging from administration to
establishing and maintaining a market to the potential installation of new monitoring
equipment aboard vessels. These requirements translate directly into increased cost to owners
and operators. Before lunging into this vague domain of new infrastructure and increased
expenses, more thorough consideration should be given to the role which ship air emissions
plays in the larger context of a solution for global greenhouse gas emissions. While efforts in
the shipping industry have produced much valuable information, there has been a lack in
contemplation of how a system for shipping can integrate and/or interface with a world-wide
solution to pollution from all types of emitting sources. In fact, some systems under current
consideration may hinder such a global solution.
Some of the tradeoffs which must be reconsidered throughout the design of a system
include: the interdependence and relationship between regulating NOx/SOx emissions and CO2
emissions, the balance between burning higher-grade fuel and increased effort in land-based
refineries, lifecycle considerations including building and scrapping of the vessel as well as
slowing down ships to reduce emissions and the associated potential need for more ships to
maintain trade patterns, and the modal share of cargo movement.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In conclusion, the concept of emissions reduction within the maritime industry has been
well received by the community, but existing efforts are fundamentally not capable of resolving
the issue with ship air emission within a global solution. Particularly under the pressure of the
EU, it is critical that the IMO continue to demonstrate progress on the issue and work towards
implementing a system in the near future. This is the only way in which the industry will
maintain control of this issue. On that note, the IMO has recently issued trial guidelines for the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and is currently working towards refining the Energy
Efficiency Operational Index (EEOI). Developing a system capable of real reduction in emissions
is one of the most critical issues (especially as a long-term concern) that will require continuous
attention and reconsideration. While the type of system has not yet been agreed upon, it is
safe to say that developing countries will need to be included in some capacity to make the
system meaningful. Furthermore, ship emissions issues must be considered within the broader
context of a global solution to pollution (with all the tradeoffs that are involved).
One evident, but crucial recommendation is to remain active in the development
process. For owners and operators, it will ease the learning curve and help management to
keep up with current issues (such as those in this study), participate in trial guidelines, and keep
up with technology, but brace for new regulation and increased operating expenses. While it is
not yet possible to predict the actual increase in cost, it is reasonable to assume that the
magnitude of cost will scale proportionately with the size of one's fleet and the age of the
vessels and equipment. One interesting consideration for operators is to speculate how a new
system will create or change the opportunities both internal and external to their fleets. How
can emissions management be addressed cooperatively within a fleet? How might this change
the interaction amongst carriers and between other companies in the industry? These types of
considerations and recommendations for ship operators have been itemized in Table 1, shown
below.
Table 1: Recommended Actions for Ship Operators
* Keep management team familiar with current developments (and up to date on
background info)
* Observe how market-based CO2 reduction tools have affected other industries
(continue to monitor aviation industry)
* Participate in trial guidelines both to ease the learning curve and offer critical
feedback
* Understand where your fleet compares to other ships (check against reported
data for trial use)
* Upgrade technology where practical, but don't assume that this will result in
exemption (even for developing countries)
* Brace for some degree of increased operational costs as well as management
costs (particularly for large fleets and/or fleets with older vessels and engines)
* Consider opportunities that exist (such as trading credits) both internal to fleet
or externally and how these interactions may be affected by final regulations
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1.0 Chapter 1: Introduction and Objective
1.1 Background Information for Greenhouse Gas Reduction Movement
While the terminology 'greenhouse gas reduction' is frequently used, many if not all
existing efforts focus primarily on carbon dioxide (C02) emissions. This is because CO2
emissions have experienced the most rapid growth rate of all of the greenhouses gases. CO2 is
also the most significant contributor to the greenhouse effect out of all of the gases with the
exclusion of water vapor. Water vapor, however, is naturally-occurring and its abundance is
essentially unaffected by human activity on a global scale. Whether referring generally to
greenhouse gas emissions or explicitly to CO2 emissions, this report places emphasis on the
reduction of CO2 emissions. It is estimated that global CO2 concentration in atmosphere must
be held to about 550 parts per million to avoid harmful climate change. In perspective with
current data, this creates the need to reduce current levels of emissions by as much as 80%.
This issue has long been under consideration on a global level. In 1988 the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) created the foundation for the work done at the United Nations
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The UNFCCC work led to the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997 which called for signatories to actively begin reducing CO2 emissions
levels, but excluded businesses of international nature, namely the shipping and aviation
industries. While the shipping industry has not yet been included, the IMO has been concerned
with related issues even before the Kyoto Protocol and recognizes the importance of controlling
the emissions contribution from shipping.
Currently there are no mandatory measures for greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction that
apply directly to the shipping industry. However, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has been considering this issue for some time and anticipates adopting shipping-specific
policy in the near future. Further, the IMO plans to implement a framework for GHG emissions
reductions prior to the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period in 2011. In
April of 2008, the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) held its 57th session
which adopted guidelines for the reduction of GHG emissions in the shipping industry. From
this meeting emerged a set of guidelines for calculating a CO2 index for use in trials based on
vessel design parameters. Further, in June of 2008, the IMO Greenhouse Gas Working Group
met to review and expand on the guidelines from the 57t h meeting. Most recently, the MEPC
held its 58t h session in October of 2008. A significant consideration for this meeting was
whether GHG emissions reductions for ships should be integrated into existing regulations or
whether there was a need for an entirely new system. Also, this meeting served to address any
other issues that must be addressed prior to the July 2009 where the MEPC plans to adopt
some framework for the reduction of GHG emissions. One key issue is to whom the new GHG
regulations will apply.
1.2 Definition of Market-Based Systems
On the most fundamental level, a market-based system is one which implements
economic incentives to prompt reduction in air emissions. A number of different market-based
systems have emerged in other industries and some examples are currently in trial use in the
shipping industry. The options with the ability to control ship air emissions on a global scale
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include an international cap and trade program, a levy on fuel, a baseline and credit system, or
a simple fine structure for exceeding a predetermined target level.
1.3 Methodology for Feasibility and Suitability Evaluation
Considering the timeliness of this issue and the momentum of the push towards certain
action in the near future, this study has taken an objective and practical approach towards
assessing the advantages, disadvantages, and potential issues inherent to each system. First, in
order to establish how a market-based system can be used to reduce air emissions, an
examination was conducted of market-based systems that are currently in place to regulate
emissions for land-based industries. Also, there is current activity towards incorporating the
aviation industry into a regional and eventually global emissions trading scheme. This work
being done in the aviation industry has been considered separately from land-based industry
because it more closely parallels the shipping industry due to its international operations. Next,
existing and proposed systems were considered for the shipping industry. By considering the
underlying concepts behind existing systems of limited scope, it will be determined whether or
not similar systems could be scalable to include the international shipping fleet. Proposed
systems will then be included into a comprehensive list of possible approaches. Once a list of
possible approaches is developed, each approach will be dissected to assess its feasibility and
practicality for the shipping industry. From this process, a list will be made of unresolved issues
requiring further attention to develop a system for shipping. Finally, based on the entire
evaluation and the unresolved issues, a recommended course of action will be suggested.
2.0 Chapter 2: Evaluation of Market-Based Systems Applied to Other Industries
2.1 Overview
This section considers a number of market-based systems that are in existence, or have
been used, to control and ultimately reduce CO2 emissions. Most of the schemes that have
been implemented have taken the form of an emissions trading system. The specifications of
allocation, auctioning of allowances, and trading between companies and/or sectors vary for
each system. This is detailed in the subsequent sections. Additionally, comments on the
success of each system have been offered where possible.
2.2 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)
2.2.1 Overview
The European Union has had an emissions trading scheme in place for CO2 emissions
since January of 2005. Relative to other existing systems, the EU ETS is the largest accounting
for upwards of 11,500 emitting sources [39]. The total value of the carbon permits comprising
this market is currently estimated to be approximately $41 billion. The intention with such a
trading system is that companies that can reduce emissions levels at a cost less than that of CO2
credits will make physical reductions whereas companies who find it more affordable to
purchase credits will opt to do so. While collectively satisfying the cap on overall emissions, the
objective of this program is to meet reduction standards at the lowest possible cost to society
[5].
2.2.2 Allocation of European Union Allowances (EAUs)
The EU ETS operates as a carbon market by allotting and trading European Union
Allowances or EAUs. The allocation process can be understood in terms of three distinct levels
of involvement. The European Commission is the highest level of authority that monitors this
system. Each member state, or country, is responsible for deriving its emissions cap and
allocation plan known as a National Allocation Plan (NAP). This plan specifies the total amount
of emissions permitted and designates each installation's (or company's) share of that total.
The European Commission is responsible for approving each member state's NAP on the
criteria that it is in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol standards and European Burden Sharing
Agreement (BSA) standards. This requirement is defined by the EU as the "Business as Usual"
or BAU standard.
Beyond approving each member state's plan, the European Commission had no part in
the designation of allowances to each individual installation. Instead, this was the key role
played by each member state government usually by the environment ministry and/or the
economics/trade ministry.
The EU ETS Directive further specified that each member state could auction up to 5% of
their allowances during the first auction period, up to 10% during the second auction period,
and then an unlimited amount thereafter. A total of four participating member state
governments chose to auction allowances during the first period. This means that all other
governments practiced free allocation.
Given the nature of achieving a reduction in emissions levels, it is implied that the NAPs
submitted must allot less allowances than the total number needed by all industries.
Furthermore, the majority of the EU15 countries specified that the burden of this shortage
would be placed on the electricity industry [39]. The primary reason behind this decision was
that this industry does not have to stand up against foreign competition. Thus, electricity
companies would more easily be able to pass the cost of additional allowances on to the
customer without worry of losing business to foreign competitors. Additionally, this system
also includes a designated fraction of allowances to be given to new installations free of charge
and also voids allowances of companies that shut down. The intent of these policies is 1) not to
hinder the ability to start new companies and 2) to avoid strategic relocation of existing
companies.
2.2.3 Benchmarking
Benchmarking is an allocation technique used to avoid differing allotment of credits to
members of similar nature who have historically produced different emissions levels. Instead,
benchmarking allocates based on a comparative index of capacity derived from past
performance. Thus, two companies with a similar history of operation would be treated equally
based on a standard rate of emissions correlating to their index.
2.2.4 Share-Based Allocation
For the most part, the member states have chosen to allocate credits based on member
share of overall emissions levels rather than benchmarking. The methodology behind this type
of allotment is that conditions experienced by individual companies, even within a single
industry sector, are much too variable to be generalized by a benchmarking process. In most
cases the availability of sufficient historical data and tight time frames further complicated the
development of reasonable benchmarks. Thus, most member state governments chose share-
based allocation because it was the most agreed upon and easiest method to implement.
2.2.5 Challenges Faced
Among the challenges faced while launching this system was the availability of
emissions historical emissions data and the collection of emissions data. Because there was no
existing authority in place to keep track of emissions, data collection was forced to be a
voluntary process. Additionally, the resulting pool of initial data rendered some methods of
allocation infeasible (due to the amount of data available, number of years worth of available
data, etc.). For this reason, it is critical that subsequent programs consider the availability of
data early on during the developmental stages.
2.2.6 Effectiveness of the System
The system as described in the previous sections has successfully implemented a
market which sets a price for excessive CO2 emissions. It is too early to observe many impacts
of this system on trade pattern and international economics. One concern that must be
monitored over time is whether abatement will grow to hinder the success of this program.
2.3 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
2.3.1 Overview
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI, is a CO2 cap and trade program that
regulates emissions from power plants (electricity generation) in ten Northeastern states.
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Participating states include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The system is designed to
reduce emissions levels by ten percent in the participating states by 2018. The reduction is
planned to be gradual throughout the duration of the objective timeline. RGGI is the first
mandatory carbon market established and implemented in the United States.
2.3.2 Structure of the System
RGGI is designed so that each participant state manages its own trading program
under the guidance of the RGGI Model Rule. However, individual companies regulated under
RGGI are able to interact with any of the ten state markets in order to acquire allowances
necessary to satisfy their state-to-state obligations. Collectively the system places a definite
bound on emissions for the entire region comprised by all participant states. Additionally, RGGI
does incorporate the use of offsets to satisfy emissions budgets. This means that projects
outside of the power industry may be eligible to satisfy some equivalence in CO2 allowances.
Under this system, operators are required to monitor and record their emissions levels
in accordance with the requirements detailed in 40 CFR part 75 [23]. This means that each
operator is responsible for installing, certifying, and continuously operating equipment to
record maximum C02 concentration, emissions rate, gas moisture content, fuel flow rate and all
other measurements specified in CFR. The particular type of equipment needed to do this is
also detailed in 40 CFR, part 75.
A 'Regional Organization' (RO) was created, in the form of a non-profit incorporation in
the state of NY, to manage system administration. It is critical to monitor this system
continuously, especially at startup, as there are concerns that customers within RGGI territory
will begin to import electricity supply. Thus, administration will report annually on the level of
imported electricity supply. Subsequently, a more elaborate report is to be delivered in 2012.
This report will consider the success of the program, impact of the system on electricity pricing
and reliability of supply, future reduction targets, imported supply, and evaluation of the use of
offsets.
2.3.3 Allocation and Trading
The Model Rule for RGGI, mentioned above, was issued by the participant states on
the 15th of August 2006 with the system scheduled to commence on the 1st of January 2009. In
the documentation, a regional emissions cap was set. A portion of this cap was then assigned
to each state. The distribution of allowances to individual companies is left at the discretion of
each state. It is also important to note that banking of allowances is permissible in this system.
Proceeds generated through RGGI's allowance auctions are used to support the development
of alternative reduced-carbon technologies.
Each company participating in this system must have a single designated account
representative to manage its CO2 budget. In order to hold this position, the individual must
apply for a permit through the appropriate regulatory agency in his/her state. As a general
guideline for allocation, at least 25% of each state's budget must be put towards 'consumer
benefit or strategic energy purpose'. As outlined in the RGGI Memorandum of Understanding,
"Consumer benefit or strategic energy purposes include the use of the allowances to promote
energy efficiency, to directly mitigate electricity ratepayer impacts, to promote renewable or
non-carbon-emitting energy technologies, to stimulate or reward investment in the
development of innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon
reduction potential, and/or to fund administration of this program," [25]. As mentioned above,
the remainder of allowances is distributed at the discretion of each state. However, almost all
of the states involved have declared that they intend to auction all of their allowances to
support consumer benefits and the overall impact of RGGI on electricity rates.
Initially, RGGI declared that approved offset projects included: landfill methane
capture and combustion, sulfur hexafluoride capture and recycling, sequestration of carbon due
to afforestation, end-use efficiency for natural gas, propane and heating oil, avoided methane
emissions from agricultural manure management operations, and projects to reduce fugitive
methane emissions from natural gas transmission and distribution [25]. There is an application
process which requires a project sponsor and independent party verification in order to
properly acquire allowance credit from offset projects. Where applicable offset projects must
implement gas collection systems to monitor gas flow rates. These data are then used to
calculate the actual level of emissions reduction as specified in the RGGI Model Rule.
A study was conducted in order to develop a feasible auction plan. This study concluded
with a list of 16 recommendations for RGGI auction format. The key recommended features
are summarized below while the entire list can be found in reference [41]. Auctions are to be
held quarterly and will take on a uniform-price format. A reserve price will be set and made
public. Unsold allowances may either be put into a contingency reserve account to reduce
fluctuation in pricing or may simply be carried over into the next auction. Lastly, auction
information will be made public, and auctions will continuously be reviewed and evaluated by
administration.
2.3.4 Effectiveness of the System
Because RGGI has only held one allowance auction and first becomes effective on
January 1st 2009, it is not yet possible to evaluate the performance of the overall system.
However, it can be noted that the system successfully placed a cap on emissions within the
electricity sector in each of the ten participating states. The infrastructure is in place and a
market for trading CO2 allowances has been established making it the first of its kind in the
United States. While it will not be certain until the annual reports begin to be issued, it has
been estimated that RGGI will cause a $3-$16 annual increase in average household electricity
bills [25].
2.4 United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS)
2.4.1 Overview
The United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS) was initiated by the United
Kingdom Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs in April of 2002. This system,
however, was designed to end (and did end) in December 2006. The UK ETS included members
referred to under the system as "Direct Participants" or DPs. All of the DPs were volunteers
into the system with the objective of reducing their historical emissions levels. As stated in an
Enviros Consulting report (commissioned by Defra) the system was started with three core
objectives in mind:
1) To secure cost-effective GHG emissions reductions;
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2) To give the UK companies early experience of emissions trading, with a particular
view to being ready for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme;
3) To encourage the establishment of an emissions trading centre in London.
2.4.2 Structure of the System
Though participation in the program was voluntary, all participants were eligible to gain a
portion of £215 million incentive that was offered. Also, in order to properly interpret data
from the UK ETS, one must understand that organizations belonging to a Climate Change
Agreement (CCA) were also eligible to participate in this system. In this circumstance, the
company could buy supplemental allowances if it did not meet its CCA Agreement.
2.4.3 Allocation and Trading
On the most basic level, DPs were allocated allowances on a cap and trade basis and
other participants were allocated allowances using a baseline and credit approach. The
distinction is that DPs are allotted allowances in advance for their annual (predetermined) cap
whereas others are given allowances at the end of each period corresponding to their recorded
emissions levels compared to their target levels. Also, there were two types of 'targets' used in
this system. An absolute target is a predetermined CO2 emissions maximum used for DPs. A
relative target, used mostly for other participants, is valued in emissions per unit of output. The
importance of this distinction is that those with relative targets may only trade on a baseline
and credit basis.
As far as transaction, there were defined transfers of allowances and trading of
allowances. An allowance transfer simply means that some quantity of allowances were moved
between different accounts whereas as a trade, by definition, involves a transfer in conjunction
with a financial transaction. Trades were permissible between DPs directly or through
'emissions brokers'. It is also important to note that trades were conducted assuming seller
liability. This means that the seller is responsible for assuring that the trade will not inhibit
them from meeting their emissions quota. The seller is otherwise subject to penalty. The
primary reason for this approach is to discourage excessive over-selling. The banking of
allowances was permitted as it motivates participants to be proactive in their emissions
reductions strategies. Also, allowances purchased are considered for tax relief while profits
from allowances sold are subject to taxes.
In addition to the allocated allowances, certain projects conducted in the UK are eligible
to earn credits. All projects must be preapproved by the government. In general, the
government considers mostly projects in electricity generation. This includes improving the
efficiency of existing operations and/or new projects in environmentally-friendly energy
generation. Because the focus of this program is reduced emissions, sequestration programs
are not as easily substituted for credits.
Each company participating in this system was responsible for calculating their own
emissions. Interestingly for this system, imported energy was included as emissions while
exported energy was not. The documentation for this system gives conversion factors based on
the source of the energy in (kg CO2/ kWhr). Each participant is required to report its emissions
on an annual basis.
Lastly, the incentive money offered was auctioned using a 'descending clock'-type
auction. Basically, a price was announced per ton of CO2. Each party then bid a reduction in
emissions in tons of CO2. This process was repeated as necessary until the price multiplied by
the sum of all bids was within the budgeted incentive money. At this point, the money was
distributed proportionally according to each party's bid.
2.4.4 Effectiveness of the System
The companies who volunteered to partake in this system were surveyed to determine
their motivation for participation. The primary reasons, as collected by the Enviros Report,
were:
1) Energy savings and/or emissions reductions.
2) Business opportunity from incentive offered and/or from 'commercially beneficial
impacts'.
3) Preparatory measure for EU ETS.
4) General experience in emissions trading.
During the first couple of years in this system, 946 companies participated in trading,
and individual transactions ranged from 1-220,000 allowances [1]. This corresponds to 2.8
million tons of C02 allowances traded in the first year of operation and 1.7 million tons of CO2
allowances traded during the second year.
In terms of emissions reductions accomplishments, 22 DPs recorded levels lower than
targeted during the first year. However, 95% of emissions under target were accomplished by
only 8 DPs. Overall, this resulted in a reduction of 4.6 million tons of CO2 during the first year.
A report produced by Nera Consulting to evaluate the UK ETS includes the graph shown in
Figure 1: UK Allowance Prices and Trading Activity (NERA Report).
Figure 1: UK Allowance Prices and Trading Activity (NERA Report)
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The majority of companies involved in this system were said to have at least broken
even. However, many companies noted that there were significant learning costs suffered
while learning compliance in an emissions trading system. On a positive note, many reported
that in general, participation in this system consequently improved the efficiency of their
operations in terms of environmental management.
2.5 Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM)
2.5.1 Overview
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, or RECLAIM, is an emissions trading program in
California that was started in 1994. RECLAIM is a cap and trade program for nitrogen oxides
(NOx) and sulfur oxides (Sox) aimed which had the initial objective to cut back on NOx
emissions by approximately 70% from 1994-2003. This program is supported by the South
Coast Air Quality Management District and includes more than 300 participants in the NOx
program and 33 particpants in the SOx program.
2.5.2 Structure of the System
RECLAIM was designed to include stationary sources of NOx and/or SOx emissions that
had emitted 4 tons of NOx or SOx in 1990 or later. In order to make emissions monitoring and
recordkeeping more feasible and practical, multiple tiers were developed to characterize
equipment based on their capacity. Then different standards of monitoring and recordkeeping
were designated for each tier. For instance, in the case of 'large sources' for NOx emissions
(sources with equipment capacity as defined in the documentation: for instance combustion
equipment with annual heat input between 10-40 mmBTU) are required to use fuel meter or
continuous monitoring systems and submit monthly electronic reports. Note that this
methodology is not directly analogous or transferable to CO2 emissions. A unique design
feature in the monitoring requirements was the incorporation of missing data provisions as a
way of using alternative means (other than continuous emissions monitoring systems) to report
emissions. However, missing data provisions used very strict, worst-case assumptions. So, this
created a buffer time for companies to get on track with required recordkeeping methods, but
provided incentive to make the transition as quickly as possible. This trend is evidenced in the
proportions of emissions reported using missing data provisions for the first 10 years. These
data are shown below in Figure 2: Percentage of Reported Emissions Using Missing Data
Provisions.
Figure 2: Percentage of Reported Emissions Using Missing Data Provisions
Percentage of Reported Emissions Using Missing Data Provisions
Percent of Reported Emissions Using Substitute Data
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
NOx 23% 20% 18% 7.3% 0.6% 8.5% 8.1% 3.4% 4.5% 8.3% 3.0%
SOx 40% 16% 186% 13% 20% 10.7% 11% 4.8% 4.7% 10.4% 3.6%
2.5.3 Allocation and Trading
RECLAIM was designed to implement a two-cycle system in which half of the
participants were divided into two groups who operated on an annual allocation plan that was
staggered by six months between the groups. The reason for this was to make the market less
susceptible to excess or shortage.
2.5.4 Effectiveness of the System
The United States' Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an evaluation of
the RECLAIM system. The evaluation was based on a number of interviews held with
stakeholders, companies in the program, environmental and regulatory agencies, and
allowance brokerage companies. In their evaluation report, they concluded with the following,
"Lessons Learned from Reclaim's Experience" [4]:
* "Market-based programs require significant planning, preparation, and
management during the development throughout the life of the program.
* Market information is a key factor affecting facility decision-making.
* Regulations should strive to create confidence and trust in the market by making
full commitment to the program and ensuring consistency in the market and
their policies.
* Unforeseen external circumstances (like energy deregulation) can have dramatic
impacts on market-based programs. Therefore, these programs must be
designed to react quickly and effectively to unforeseen external factors.
* Periodic evaluation, revisiting of program design assumptions, and contingency
strategies are crucial to keeping programs on track.
* Regulators need to have a strong understanding of the regulated facilities and
the factors impacting their decision-making."
3.0 Chapter 3: Aviation and the EU ETS
3.1 Overview
Currently, the aviation industry in Europe is not covered by the EU ETS, however, there
is proposed legislation to regulate aviation emissions within the EU by 2011 and to regulate
emissions from all flights using EU airports by 2012. The intention of this program is to gently
merge it into the EU ETS as a model for other countries to become included into a worldwide
emissions trading scheme. The Commission of the European Communities establishes the
framework for this system in their 2006 proposal for amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC
(Establishing A Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community
and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 13 October 2003) which established the initial
greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading scheme. With a said growth in international
aviation emissions of more than 87% since 1990, it is estimated that aviation emissions could
negate more than 25% of environmental benefits accomplished (for the EU) under the Kyoto
Protocol [20].
3.2 Structure of the System
In 2004, the members of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed that
an aviation-specific trading scheme was not desirable. Thus, the EU directive proposes
incorporation of international aviation emissions into member States' trading schemes. Note
that this proposal was written by the European Union not the ICAO. While the members of the
ICAO agreed that this approach was conceptually appropriate, there is much controversy
amongst actual air carriers as to when and how new measures should be implemented. The
key aspects of this system are explicitly listed in the directive as follows:
* "Aircraft operators will be the entities responsible for complying with the
obligations imposed by the scheme.
* The scheme will cover all flights arriving at or departing from an airport in the
Community (EU) as of 1 January 2012. Flights between EU airports will be
covered from 1 January 2011.
* Flights by State aircraft, flights under visual flight rules, circular flights, flights
for testing navigation equipment or for training purposes, rescue flights and
flights by aircraft with a maximum take-off weight of less than 5700 kg will be
excluded from the scheme.
* To address other gases, by the end of 2008, the Commission will put forward a
proposal to address the nitrogen oxide emissions from aviation after a thorough
impact assessment.
* In order to avoid duplication and an excessive administrative burden on aircraft
operators, each aircraft operator, including operators from third countries, will
be administered by one Member State only.
* In contrast to the existing scheme, the method of allocating allowances will be
harmonized across the Community (EU).
* The total number of allowances to be allocated to the aviation sector will be
determined at Community level by reference to average emissions from
aviation in the years 2004-2006.
* A fixed percentage of the total quantity of allowances will be allocated free of
charge on the basis of a benchmark to aircraft operators which submit an
application (the earliest application relating to 2008 data.) For the period 2011-
2012 this percentage will correspond to the average percentage proposed by
the Member States including auctioning in their national allocation plans.
Thereafter, this will be reviewed in the light of the results of the general review
of the emissions trading scheme.
* The details of how auctioning will work such as appropriate design and timing
will be set out in a Commission Regulation. Auctioning proceeds should be used
to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change and to cover
administrative costs.
* Like other participants in the Community scheme, aircraft operators will have to
monitor their emissions of carbon dioxide and report them to the competent
authority of its administering Member State by 31 March each year. The
reports must be verified to make sure that they are accurate. The basic
principles for monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions set out in the
proposal will be elaborated by guidelines.
* Aircraft operators will be able to buy allowances from other sectors in the
Community scheme for use to cover their emissions.
* Aircraft operators will also be able to use project credits - so-called Emissions
Reductions Units (ERUs) and Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) - from the
Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism (JI/CDM) up to a
harmonized limit equivalent to the average of the limits prescribed by Member
States in their national allocation plans for other sectors in the Community
scheme.
* Domestic aviation will be included in the scheme and treated in the same way
as international aviation.
* Special considerations to the treatment of air services to remote or isolated
regions which are particularly dependent on air transport services, can best be
given within the framework of existing measures such as public services
obligations and aid having a social character under Article 87(2) of the Treaty."
The above-stated objectives set forth for the directive were to be funded entirely by the
'financial instrument for the environment (LIFE+ for 2007-2013)'.
Under the proposed system, 100% of allowances (as determined from historical data)
are to be allotted. Each aircraft operator is responsible for monitoring and reporting its
emissions. This must be done in compliance with the directive by recording fuel consumption
and multiplying by a given emissions factor.
3.3 Allocation and Trading
Under this system, each aircraft operator must apply directly to their governing member
state for allowance allocation. In general terms, this is done by providing verified 'tonne-
kilometer' data. Beyond this part of the process, the operator is given EUAs which may be used
in the EU ETS in the full capacity described in Section 2.2.
3.4 Conclusions
Because international flights comprise a significant percentage of aviation in the EU and
are not included in the Kyoto Protocol's targeted reductions, a special approach has been taken
to control these emissions. The responsibility for developing a system to regulate international
aviation emissions has been placed within the ICAO as they are the world-wide authority for
aviation. It is most important to note that the aviation industry gave preference to joining the
EU ETS as opposed to creating their own emissions trading system to account for international
emissions. After thorough consideration, stakeholders, the ICAO, and the European
Commission have agreed that integrating international aviation emissions into the EU ETS is
most reasonable approach. When compared against other options such as a levy on fuel this
option has the lowest cost to society and therefore produces the desired economic benefits
with the least impact on the international aviation commercial market. While this approach
does not directly affect ticket prices, airlines will incur additional expenses associated with
reducing emissions or purchasing additional allowances. Thus, it has been speculated that
some cost on the order of €1.8-9 for flights within the EU will be passed on to the customer
through ticket pricing. It is also predicted that this increase in ticket price will grow larger for
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international flights in proportion to flight distance. This implies that the additional expenses
incurred by airlines would not be distributed uniformly amongst ticket prices, but rather
according to distance traveled. It has also been noted that this predicted increase is much
lesser in magnitude than the increases seen recently due to rising oil prices [19].
Another consideration is how the addition of the aviation industry will affect the already
existing market for allowances in the EU. It is predicted that this abrupt increase in demand will
be absorbed by an increased number of emissions offsetting projects rather than a steep
increase in allowance market price.
The governments of the European Union just recently (October 2008) gave final
approval to include in the EU ETS by 2012 all flights, including international, with origin or
destination in the EU [9]. This news was received with strong opposition from both European
carriers and by the United States' aviation industry. An October New York Times article stated
that, "Airline Chiefs immediately criticized the decision, saying it would cost the industry at
least 3.5 billion euros ($4.4 billion) each year to comply" [9]. Many oppose this regulation
saying that its objective will not be realized without the inclusion of worldwide markets. The
general reaction appears to be that this step is not yet ready to be taken and that it is poor
timing in conjunction with the recent record-high oil prices that have already devastated air
carriers. Propositions are being devised to convince the European Union to financially support
this transition if they want to persist with this regulatory move during such a low point in the
recent economy.
4.0 Chapter 4: Evaluation of Existing Systems Applied to the Shipping Industry
4.1 Overview
While this chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all efforts to reduce
emissions in the shipping industry, it examines more closely some existing programs, how they
operate, and their effectiveness. The Green Flag Program on the West Coast of the United
States and the Swedish Maritime Administration's environmentally-differentiated fairway dues
system are two of the most developed examples.
4.2 Port of Long Beach/Port of Los Angeles Green Flag Program
4.2.1 Overview
Both the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los Angeles, two of America's most highly
trafficked ports, have long prided themselves in environmental awareness. In 2006, the South
Coast Air Quality Management District, California Air Resources Board, and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cooperated to develop the San Pedro Bay Ports Clean
Air Action Plan. This is a five-year plan for significant overall emissions reductions from land-
based port equipment, trucks in and out of the terminals, and ships utilizing the ports. The
Green Flag Program targets the ship air emissions reduction portion of this overall plan.
The Green Flag Program is a multi-million dollar effort funded by the port. The program
promotes locally-reduced air emissions by setting a voluntary 12-knot speed limit extending for
approximately 20 miles around the port's surrounding waters. Though the speed limit is
voluntary, the port rewards compliance with public recognition and reduced dockage rates. In
particular, any carrier that achieves at least 90% compliance in one calendar year is granted a
37
15% discount in dockage fees for the following calendar year. The speed of every vessel within
the designated zone is recorded by the Marine Exchange of Southern California [46].
In addition to the voluntary speed reduction program, the ports have also begun a
couple of other parallel initiatives. The Port of Long Beach has invested approximately $10
million dollars in a one-year program to promote the use of low sulfur fuel when operating
within 40 nautical miles of the port. The program began on July 1, 2008 and will continue until
June 30, 2009. During this time period, the port will pay the cost differential for carriers who
opt to burn more expensive low-sulfur MGO with 0.2% sulfur content or less [46]. Also, the
port is currently studying the implications, both technical and financial, of adopting a 'cold-
ironing' policy. The ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles have already set tentative plans for all
major cruise and container terminal berths to be fit with shore power within ten years.
4.2.2 Effectiveness of the System
In general, the Green Flag Program has been successful in achieving the type of local air
emissions reduction for which it was developed. The Port of Long Beach's Executive Director,
Richard D. Steinke said, "The Green Flag Program has been a hit. It's been well received in the
shipping community and has achieved major reductions in air pollution," [46]. During the three
years since its installment, overall program compliance has risen to 90% of all visiting vessels.
Based on this success, in December of 2008, the Port of Long Beach is expanding the program
to include a 25% discount on dockage fees for vessels complying with the 12-knot speed limit
within a 40 nautical mile zone surrounding the port. Among the numerous statistics published
on the port's website, the Port of Long Beach said that the Green Flag Program reduced CO2
emissions from ships by 26,700 tons in 2007 [46].
4.3 Swedish Fairway Dues
4.3.1 Overview
Since 1998, the Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) has promoted environmental
awareness by implementing environmentally-differentiated fairway dues. Swedish fairways
have long been funded exclusively by the SMA's fairway dues system. These fees go towards
support items such as navigation aids, ice breaking, pilots, etc. The general fee takes on a two-
part structure. Part of the fee is assessed based on the vessel's gross tonnage (GT) and the
second part is based on the volume of cargo originating or destined for Swedish ports. In 1996,
as part of a cooperative effort between the SMA, the Swedish Ship Owners Association, and the
Swedish Ports' and Stevedores' Association a plan was agreed upon to reduce ship emissions by
75% over the course of only a few years. As a result of this plan, the environmentally-
differentiated fairway dues system was introduced in 1998. This was the primary means of
achieving their goal; however, a significant amount of money was also invested in emissions
cleaning and treatment. This system has since undergone some minor changes in fee
assessment.
Under the new scheme, the GT portion of the fee was eligible for discount based on the
sulfur content of the fuel being burned and on the NOx emissions rate. The newest revision of
this system includes an additional charge for vessels not burning low-sulfur fuel and still
includes a discount for vessels achieving predetermined reduced NOx emissions. Table 2 and
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Table 3 show the current environmentally-differentiated fee structure (monetary values given
in Swedish Krona - SEK).
Table 2: Environmentally-Differentiated Dues: Sulfur Content
Sulphur charges
The Port of GWbmrg ma.s n .dra charge of 0.20 SEK/GT for each call.
For possenger sips, possenger Ferries or rail Fre., if the smlphr corfent of the fuel For
renning the ship eoaseds 0.5 per int by weight
For ohr veuusk if 6 miher cwp tf fuel F * aui the uel xaseds 1.0 per cunt
Table 3: Environmentally-Differentiated Dues: NOx Discount
Nitric oxide discount
Ships that by various measures have reduced Iheir nitric oxide emissions to less than 12 grmins per
kilowatt-hour are given a reduction of the harour dues as follows:
Redu.ion in SEK per unit aF the hlp
Enission level in gra t aF NOx/kWh Oro"s tnnage (GTJ
I1.99 - 6.01 0.05 SEK/GT
6.00 - 2.01 0.10 SEK/GT
2.00 or iess 0.20 SEK/GT
In order to redeem the benefits of the NOx discount plan, the operator must file an
application with the SMA for verification of its reduced NOx levels. Upon completion of the
application process, a certificate is issued stating the vessel's certified NOx emission level per
kWh. Additionally the vessel operator must provide documentation verifying exclusive use of
low-sulfur fuel in order to avoid any additional fees.
4.3.2 Effectiveness of the System
An essay written in 2002 by Henrik Swahn, Senior Advisor at the Department for
Maritime Policy and Public Affairs at the SMA provided some early quantitative evidence of the
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program's success. At the time of the report, 25 major ports had already implemented the
environmentally-differentiated dues system. In the 2001 SMA Annual Report it was estimated
that the coastal waters of Sweden had seen a decrease on the order of 50,000 tons of SOx and
27,000 tons of NOx. Figure 3: Number of Ships Attaining Sulfur Certificates in 1998 illustrates
the early success of the low-sulfur incentive program [50]. In 1999 it was estimated that there
had been a reduction in sulfur emissions by approximately 30% by volume.
Figure 3: Number of Ships Attaining Sulfur Certificates in 1998
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The essay also includes a discussion of optimal maritime emission pricing. The underlying
conclusion in this discussion is that the operator should pay a fee equal to the marginal cost of
'damage'. A constant predetermined estimate of the marginal cost of damage is used in this
paper. It is important to note that assessing the cost to society is arguably the most difficult
challenge in this type of approach. The study recognizes that ships calling frequently in ports
practicing this method would realize abatement costs lower than the marginal cost of damage
while ships less frequently calling these ports would have higher abatement costs. This
suggests that the only truly effective policy would have to govern worldwide.
4.4 Conclusion
While the significant effort invested in each of these programs is statistically evidenced
to achieve decreasing levels in ship emissions, it is most important to realize that these
achievements are on a localized level. The scalability of systems like these is an issue that will
be investigated more closely in subsequent chapters. A positive similarity to extract from these
programs is that the shipping community (at least those involved in these particular cases) has
responded well to these incentivized programs. This is a good indication that in the right
context and under proper motivation, the shipping industry will take justified steps towards
environmentally cooperative operation.
5.0 Chapter 5: Evaluation of Proposed Systems Applied to the Shipping Industry
5.1 Overview
Expedited by external pressure for the shipping industry to develop and implement
formal policy for the control of ship air emissions, the International Maritime Organization's
(IMO) Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has been and is continuing to
investigate potential emissions regulations mechanisms. Due to the international nature of the
shipping industry, working through the IMO is the most appropriate route for developing a
solution fit for the entire shipping community. Most recently this issue has been the sole topic
of discussion at the June 2008 meeting of the MEPC Working Group on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (organized as a result of the MEPC's 57th meeting) as well as a significant issue of
discussion at the MEPC's 58th Session in October 2008. These meetings have opened this issue
to comment from any and all IMO members and many IMO Member Governments have
participated to make this a collaborative effort. For reference, Table 4 lists Member
Governments that were present at the intersessional GHG working group meeting.
Table 4: IMO Member Governments Participating in GHG Working Group
AUSTRALIA MARSHALL ISLANDS
BAHAMAS NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM NEW ZEALAND
BRAZIL NORWAY
CANADA PANAMA
CHILE POLAND
CHINA PORTUGAL
CYPRUS REPUBLIC OF KOREA
DENMARK SAUDI ARABIA
FINLAND SINGAPORE
FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA
GERMANY SPAIN
GREECE SWEDEN
INDIA TURKEY
ITALY UNITED KINGDOM
JAPAN UNITED STATES
MALTA
Although the MEPC's work is still evolving, it is possible to recognize three types of
approaches being taken. The first major concept under investigation is the feasibility of an
emissions trading scheme (ETS) for the shipping industry. The other major development is a
technical approach in the form of a design or operational CO2 index for ships. The last category
of proposed ideas, grouped here as alternative approaches, is comprised mostly of bunker levy
considerations or concepts which represent a combination of multiple approaches. The
subsequent sections of this chapter serve to compile general concepts and issues for each
approach gathered from IMO Member Government submittals for the GHG working group and
58 th Session. Table 5 and Table 6 show how documents submitted for these two meetings can
be loosely grouped as discussed above. Note that documents with concepts categorized as
'other' are primarily suggestions/amendments to previous works.
Table 5: Document Summary: GHG Working Group June 2008
Summary of Documents Submitted to Agenda for MEPC GHG Working Group June 2008
Submitted
Concept Document By: Description
GHG-WG
Market Based 1/5/7 Germany Maritime ETS
GHG-WG
Market Based 1/5/6 France Carbon Market
GHG-WG
Market Based 1/5/5 Norway ETS
GHG-WG European
Market Based 1/5/3 Commission ETS
GHG-WG
Market Based 1/5/2 Interferry maritime ETS
Indexing 2 Japan C02 index
Friends of
HG-WG Earth Mandatory Policies (technical/operational/economic) - Design index- cold ironing - vessel traffic
Combination V5 International planning - speed reduction - fuel levy -cap and trade
Combination 1/54 Norway Levy cap and trade
Table 6: Document Summary: MEPC 5 8th Session (GHG Issues)
Summary of Documents Submitted to Agenda for MEPC 58th Session
Docume
Concept nt Submitted By: Description
MEPC
Agenda 58/1 'Agenda
MEPC
Market Based 58/4/22 Denmark Feasibility of International Compensation Fund
MEPC
Market Based 58/4/25 France, Germany, Norway Comment on GHG-WG meeting (Oslo)
MEPC
Market Based 58/4/19 International Bunker Industry Association CO02 Cap and trade for shipping sector
MEPC
-- - " Fund for Nature (WWFI esses concerns r market-based instrMarket
58/4/8
MEPC
Indexing 58/4/9 Denmark Verification methods for calculations
MEPC
Indexing 58/4/10 Denmark Auxiliary power considerations
MEPC Considerations for expressing normal max load for auxiliary
Indexing 58/4/24 Denmark eng in CO2 index calculation
MEPC
Indexing -Denmark and Norway Definition of ship speed
MEPC
Indexing 58/4/7 Finland and Sweden Ship-specific design coefficients - ice-strengthened vessels
MEPC International Association of Classification Comments on GHG-WG meeting (Oslo) with regard toCO2 design
Indexing 58/4/30 Societies (IACS) index and verification of input parameters.
M PC
Indexing 58/4/14 INTERTANKO Simplified index suggestion
M EPC
Intdexn 58/4/1 I fTERTANKO,. OCIMF, RIMCQ Methodolog far monsitorin shi eVffiiency
MEPC Incorporating energy-saving device effects into CO2 index
Indexing 58/4/26 Japan, calculation
MEPC
indexing 58//2 Japan Guidelines for obtaining
MEPC Technical 'comment with regard to wind drag and added wave
I idexing 58/4/28 Japan resistance considerations for performance coefficient, fw
MEPC
Indexing 58/4/21 Japan Speed reduction coefficient calculation
MEPC Proposed amendments to MEPC/Circ.471 for measure of cargo
Indexing 58/4/11 Marshall Islands mass for various ship types
MEPC Outcome of work with UNFCC and IPCC to harmonize C to CO2
Indexing 58/4/3 Note by Secretariat conversion fa ctor
MEPC
Indexing 58/4/35 United States Proposed revision to C02 index calculation as per draft guidelines
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MEPC
58/INF
Combination 21 Friends of the Earth international (FOE) Technical/operational measures for reduction of GHG emissions
MEPC institute of Marine Engineering Science and
Combination 58/4/21 Technology (IMarEst) Framework considerations for Index, port tax, fuel levy, ETS
MEPC
58/lNF
Combination 14 Norway Technical and operational measures
MEPC
Combination 58/4/15 United Kingdom Suggested framework for shipping sector'
MEPC
Combination 58/4/17 United States Suggested framework for voluntary and mandatory actions
Other 58/4/23 Australia suggestions for IMO system framework
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan,MEPCOther,58/4/16 Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama, United Proposed amendment to principles set forth in MEPC 57/4/2
States
MEPC
Other 58/4/31 Brazi Comments on GHG-WG meeting (Oslo)
MvEPC
Other 58/5/4 Denmark, Japan, Korea MEPC 57 guidelines for Tier III exhaust gas after-treatment systems
MEPC Proposed revision to MARPOL Annex VI Emission Control Area
Other 58/5/3 France and Germany (ECA) designation criteria,
MEPC
Other 58/5/11 INTERFERRY MARPOL Annex VI - Sulphur limitations
MEPC International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA),
Other S/4 International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) MARPOL Annex VI - regulation 18(2) revision
MEPC
Other 58/5/10 Japan Suggested change in date of entry for MARPOL Annex VI revisions
MEPC Marshall Islands, International Chamber of
Other 58/5/8 Shipping Proposed amendment to MEPC.170(57)
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MEPC
Other 58/4/1 Note by Secretariat Annotati ca pvion
MEPC
Other Note by Secretariat R eport on the oto m H Stnteuyof m t f GHteMEPC
Other 58/4/1 Note by Secretariat Felalitynsiiati ontMEPC
Other 58//5 Note by Secretariat'n ments t MAPAnnex VI ag Axc T aMEPCOtherP Su ar 4/2 NoebyScrtriterrtti ontex and Kuydoito Prdotoc en ARO
Other 58/5/ Note by Secretariat WAn e de' toVRO nexV n i TcnclCd
MEPC Clarification for advice for guidelines for exhaust gas cleaning
Other 58/5/S Note by Secretariat systems MEPC.170(57)
MEPC Oil Companies International Marine Forum
Other 58/5/6 (OCIMF) Review of MEPC 57 ECA criteria
MEPC Amendments to Annex Vl- recommended technical correction to
Other 58/5/9 United States regulation 13(7)(a)/support for regulation 13(7)
MEPC
Other 58/5/12 United States Support for amendments to MARPOL Annex VI
MEPC
Other 58/4/32 China and India Comment on GHG-WG meeting (Oslo)
MEPC
Other 58/INF 7 ICS, BIMCO, Intercargo, Intertanko, OCIMF Ship Efficiency Management Plan
MEPC International Petroleum Industry Re-visitation of MEPC 57 qualification criteria for emission control
Other 58/5/7 Environmental Conservation Association (tPIECA) areas (ECA)
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5.2 ETS for the Shipping Industry
5.2.1 Overview
The foundation for this approach is to hold the shipping industry accountable for its
emissions by including shipping in an emissions trading scheme. This can be done either by
introducing shipping into a pre-existing system such as the EU ETS (open system - including
other industries) or to develop an ETS exclusively for the shipping industry (closed system). As
a point of clarification, the notion of ETS in this context is referring particularly to CO2
emissions. The discussion thus far overwhelmingly suggests that an ETS be organized solely for
the shipping community. However, this issue has not been finalized and both open and closed
systems are still under consideration.
5.2.2 Potential Effectiveness and Limitations
A positive aspect of an ETS is that a true upper bound for CO2 emissions can be defined
and adhered to. Thus, under the large assumption that the effects of global warming are
comprehended well enough to determine necessary levels of reduction for the shipping
industry, an ETS would provide an absolute aggregate monitoring mechanism. With all
technical and logistical issues aside, an ETS is a sound way to limit overall emissions. Also,
establishing a market for CO2 would stimulate the most cost-effective approach towards
reduced emissions.
Of course there are numerous issues and potential limitations that complicate the
development of a feasible, practical, and effective ETS. Inevitably governance-related issues
with regard to developing countries quickly complicate this plan. A number of member
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governments noted that many proposals for a shipping ETS were submitted by European
countries. As follow-on to this point, Saudi Arabia suggested that a European shipping ETS
would be a good trial to evaluate this plan. While this may not be the best or most practical
approach, a key point made is that in developing this scheme, its effectiveness in targeting
global emissions must be fully understood. Thus, a smaller scale trial may provide quantitative
evidence of such a system's ability to reduce global emissions from ships. Other issues include;
how to monitor, record, and verify emissions data, who should it apply to (vessel size, vessel
trade, unilaterally etc.), how to allocate emissions allowances, how to administer the system,
how to pay for administrative expenses, other costs related to an active market (transaction
costs etc.), what to do with any revenue generated etc. All of these issues and more must be
understood and addressed before an ETS can become a feasible solution to the problem. These
issues and potential methods to deal with them will be further investigated in subsequent
chapters of this study.
5.3 CO2 Index for Ships
5.3.1 Overview
The following excerpt from a study conducted by Matthew Donatelli in the spring of
2008 provides a very brief background for the continuously-evolving CO2 indexing scheme for
ships. Note that this study was prior to the MEPC 58th session and that little progress had been
made in distinguishing between a design index and an operation index.
"... MEPC/Circ.471 offered a flexible set of guidelines for developing a C02 index for
ships. This document also invited, "industry, organizations, and interested
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Administrations," to use these guidelines for trial and offer input back to MEPC 58 (to be
held in October of 2008). Because the quantity of C02 emitted is a function of the
amount of fuel consumed in any carbon-based combustion process, the proposed index
can also serve as a vessel performance rating of fuel efficiency. More specifically, the
index is calculated to quantify energy efficiency in terms of C02 emitted per unit of
transport work (IMO, MEPC/Cir.471). In the MEPC Interim Guidelines for Voluntary Ship
C02 Emission Indexing for Use in Trials, this index is explicitly given to take the form
shown below.
Index = mco2 / (transport work)
Where mco2 is the mass rate (grams/hour) of C02 emitted. As mentioned before, the
amount of C02 emitted is directly related to fuel consumption (FC) which MEPC defines
to be all fuel consumed both underway and in port during the period of evaluation. The
calculation of transport work, most appropriately in the form of tonne-miles (or their
equivalent) is more vaguely defined. Logically, transport work is then a function of
distance traveled and amount of cargo carried."
While ongoing discussion and technical comment has been offered by many member
governments, the fundamental idea remains to index ships based on the ratio of their CO2
emissions levels to the benefit they offer, taken as the product of the cargo they move and how
far they move it. Table 6: Document Summary: MEPC 58th Session (GHG Issues), above
illustrates, at a glance, the types of technical comment that has been offered. These include
everything from corrective coefficients for ice-strengthened vessels, to auxiliary power
considerations and suggestions for monitoring and verification.
At the MEPC 58th session, the design index that has been developed from MEP/Cir.471,
now known as the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) has been set for trial application by
calculation. Results from this trial are to be further discussed at an intersessional working
group meeting scheduled for March 2009. An operational version of the index, now referred to
as the Energy Efficiency Operational Index (EEOI) is still under consideration and will be subject
to review at the March 2009 meeting.
5.3.2 Potential Effectiveness and Limitations
While technical response has been abundant and productive, it appears that there is
underdeveloped link between the indexing scheme(s) and how they could serve as an effective
mechanism to reduce international shipping emissions. Furthermore, a design index would
require a significant amount of time before measurable benefits are realized (assuming
grandfathering of existing vessels). An operational index could be used as a metric for
quantitatively characterizing compliance or assessing penalty, possibly in the form of a port tax
etc. However, there is a great risk that strict enforcement of either index may actually cause
the need for more ships or cause ships to operate outside of their conventional trade routines.
This could potentially result in greater aggregate ship air emissions than the status quo. Thus,
without supplementary measures, is an indexing scheme capable of regulating an absolute
bound on ship emissions? It has been pointed out that if an index were approved and applied
to all ships involved in international trade, the IMO (or some other central body) would have a
means to establish a baseline for efficiency of the world fleet.
As with other proposed approaches, the notion of common but differentiated
responsibility has already arisen with regard to whom the index should apply. In order for the
scheme to be effective it must reduce global emissions from the shipping industry, however,
developing countries continue to defend their appeal for exemption. This issue, along with
others such as measuring, recording, and verifying emissions data, is examined more closely in
the subsequent chapters of this study.
5.4 Alternative Approaches
5.4.1 Overview
As mentioned earlier, the two other major approaches that have been proposed are a
levy on fuel and various 'hybrid' concepts which combine components of a couple types of
systems. In theory a fuel levy is simple; since the ship's fuel is the source of its emissions,
associating an additional charge with the price of the fuel holds ship operators responsible for
their emissions. In order for this to be practical there are a number of hurdles which must first
be overcome. This includes the common but differentiated responsibility debate and whether
or not this would apply to all ships.
As for hybrid plans, these are approaches comprised of any number of combinations of
the mechanisms which have been and continue to be discussed through the IMO. While this
idea has been suggested, there have not been any very detailed proposals of a hybrid system.
Logically, this is because each of the other mechanisms is still being thought through,
developed, and evaluated. An example of a hybrid concept would be to use a design index as
regulatory guidance during the design phase of the ship and then to use an operational index as
a metric in part of a shipping ETS.
5.4.2 Potential Effectiveness and Limitations
The ability of a fuel levy to reduce ship air emissions is questionable. While a levy on
bunkers would hold ship operators responsible for their emissions (as the 'price' of C02
emissions would be passed down), this mechanism has no real control over the absolute level
of emissions. Additional issues inherent to this plan include administration responsibility, legal
concerns for standardized international application, and concerns about an unjustified modal
shift in cargo movement. For any potential hybrid plans, issues inherent to the components
parts of the program (discussed above) are inherently adopted. These issues will be examined
more closely in subsequent chapters of this study.
5.5 Conclusion
The shipping community recognizes that international cooperation is essential in
developing a practical, feasible, and effective system for the reduction of ship air emissions.
The ongoing development and discussion within the IMO, and specifically the MEPC, is serving
as the vehicle to synthesize the proposed ideas of any participating member governments of
the IMO. This work has been the source of the systems noted above, and will continue to mold
the needs of the shipping community into a program suitable for the reduction of ship air
emissions. However, as indicated in the text above there are a number of issues that require
further attention prior to implementing a system for the maritime industry. Many of these,
including monitoring, recording, and enforcement issues as well as administrative and
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infrastructure issues will be considered in subsequent chapters of this study. Also there will be
further discussion of solutions which (against intuition) may lead to evasive results and an
increase in overall emissions versus programs that have the potential to promote a real
reduction in ship air emissions. It is also worth noting that automobile manufacturers in the
United States face environmental regulations based on the theoretical output of their engines
while the shipping industry seems to be focused on the actual operating conditions of vessels.
The operating output is not only more difficult to measure and enforce, but regulating the
actual output of vessels is also a disadvantage to ship operators.
It must also be noted that the work being done through the IMO under constant
pressure by the European Union. The European Union has made it clear that they intend to
take matters into their own hands should the IMO not continue to demonstrate that substantial
progress is being made towards the implementation of greenhouse gas reducing measures.
The timeline in Figure 4, from a presentation by Nicholas Rock of Dewey & LeBoeuf [48],
illustrates the potential timeframe in which the EU plans to develop and implement its own
system through Brussels. Note that the system would commence by 2015.
Figure 4: Potential EU Timeline
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6.0 Chapter 6: Unresolved Issues for At-Sea Application
6.1 Overview
Chapter 5.0 explored the various types of systems that are currently being considered
for maritime application and noted that there are a plethora of issues associated with each type
of system. To most relevantly address these issues, this section has organized them into an
assortment of higher-level, system-generic concerns. These are the critical issues that must be
discussed, understood, and overcome in order for successful application of a market-based
system for the shipping community. Within each of these macro-issues there resides a dynamic
subset of issues that will continue to evolve as a particular system is honed in on. For this
reason, thorough and practical discussion and speculation is absolutely essential to defining a
system which is able to meet the very specialized needs of the maritime industry.
6.2 Meaningful System vs. Political Satisfaction
Many of the issues previously noted question what it will take to implement a market-
based system capable of achieving real, and meaningful, reduction in ship air emissions. Amidst
all of the convoluted legs of this discussion it must not be neglected that this, after all, is the
fundamental reason for developing and using such a system. To clarify, the term 'real'
reduction means reducing the total air emissions associated with the world fleet (a very difficult
number to keep track of which this chapter elaborates upon). The term 'meaningful' reduction
implies that the level of reduction corresponds to scientifically determined expectations for a
safe and sustainable environment. While the shipping community can work towards achieving
real reductions, meaningful reductions is another whole debate outside of the scope of this
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work. Frankly, any evolution in that debate is not likely to alter the current discussion within
the maritime industry.
Perhaps the most significant ongoing debate relevant to this issue is regarding the
notion of common but differentiated responsibility. Supporters of this idea defend that only
member states included in the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Annex I should be regulated by any new emissions system [15]. The countries
included under UNFCCC Annex I are listed below in Table 7 [30].
Table 7: UNFCCC Annex I Parties
Australia Liechtenstein
Austria Lithuania
Belarus Luxembourg
Belgium Monaco
Bulgaria Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
Croatia Norway
Czech Republic Poland
Denmark Portugal
Estonia Romania
European Community Russian Federation
Finland Slovakia
France Slovenia
Without even distinguishing between which countries are and are not included in this
list, it is intuitive that a system which applies only to certain countries does not have the ability
to control air emissions from the entire shipping community. This is common sense; whether
or not this is to make regulations fairer to developing countries, focus on the actual objective of
this system must not be lost. Clearly this would void the original objective. In the previously
established IMO Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, MARPOL Annex VI,
non-discriminatory treatment was achieved by the inclusion of a, "no more favorable" clause.
MARPOL Annex VI deals, in particular, with the reduction of NOx and SOx emissions. Lastly, and
not to harp on a seemingly straight-forward point, members not listed under Annex I account
for more than 2/3 of the world fleet (greater than 400 gross tons). This is shown below in
Table 8 [53].
Germany Spain
Greece Sweden
Hungary Switzerland
Iceland Turkey
Ireland Ukraine
Italy United Kingdom
Japan United States of America
Latvia
Table 8: Distribution of the World Fleet (March 2008)
For Ships Above 400 GT
Number of Ships GT DW
20,872 209,015,681 263,820,104Annex I Flag States (33.42%) (26.08%) (22.82%)
Non-Annex I Flag 41,119 593,330,359 892,384,249
States (66.58%) (73.92%) (77.18%)
Total 61,862 801,346,040 1,156,204,353
6.3 Emissions Monitoring and Enforcement
Given the existing infrastructure and the complex international nature of this industry,
monitoring and enforcement of any new system will certainly prove to be a complicated and
tedious task. The first, and most straight-forward, concern is: how to collect emissions data
from ships? A practical solution may be to have ship operators record and submit fuel
consumption data for all ships in their fleets. The amount of CO2 emissions could then be
calculated relatively accurately based on the grade of fuel being used (from its chemical
composition). While most, if not all, ships are already capable of tracking their fuel
consumption, there are still a few difficulties with this approach. First, it is not 100% accurate
as some error will arise in calculation (and variation in fuel properties/ actual onboard
conditions). Also, there would be a great amount of effort, and a certain level of trust,
associated with ensuring compliance. This would likely require some responsible third party to
conduct inspections, audits, etc.
For these reasons, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the most appropriate way to
monitor emissions is to use CO2 measurement devices on the stacks of ships. In contrast to the
previous idea, few if any ships are currently equipped to do this. Thus, this method would
require a significant initial investment in infrastructure upgrading. While this is merely an idea,
not yet accompanied by a cost estimate, its impact would certainly be substantial as it affects
all ships. However, with such a system in place, there would be a relatively simple, unbiased
means of measuring and recording emissions data. Further, with today's technology
capabilities, data from ships could easily be transmitted to and compiled by whatever central
body is governing the system. More comment on infrastructure is offered in the next section,
Establishing and Sustaining Infrastructure.
Another issue that further complicates enforcement is that cargo movement in the
maritime industry is not always a clearly-defined origin to destination trip. Cross-dock and
transshipped cargoes void some of the previously mentioned methodologies for other
industries such as the airline industry. For example, whereas a flight may be assessed a certain
surcharge based on its origin to destination (hypothetically), a ship is likely carrying cargoes
from multiple origin-destination pairs that may have also changed ship one or more times. Due
to this complexity, a simplified system which associates emissions responsibility with origin-
destination travel is seemingly not feasible, and certainly not practical, for the shipping
industry. It should also be noted that some simplified approaches must be thoroughly
evaluated to avoid loopholes which may be taken advantage of. Consider, for instance, a
system which charges a certain landing fee to all flights landing in a European airport based on
the distance from their point of origin; however, there is no fee for flights landing in non-
European airports (again hypothetical). It seems obvious that flight trends into this European
airport would quickly shift to multi-leg trips with the first leg covering as much distance as
possible between two unregulated airports. While this is a hypothetical situation for the
aviation industry, it is easy to see that similar loopholes have potential to be even more
vulnerable in the maritime industry. This issue provides good insight, and a perfect segue, into
the Tradeoff Considerations section later in this chapter.
6.4 Establishing and Sustaining Infrastructure
Another large uncertainty in the development of a new system is: who will build and
manage the infrastructure necessary to maintain this system? A centralized organization to
administer the new system is clearly a prerequisite for all of the systems under consideration.
The specialized functions of this administration will continue to be defined as a system is
finalized and applied. For this reason, infrastructure considerations have been widely
acknowledged, but seem to continually be placed on the backburner.
Beyond a centralized administration, which will inevitably require significant investment
of time and money, other infrastructure needs will arise that will more directly impact ship
operators. If a system is based on trading carbon credits or allowances, all operators will have
to manage their credits. This could have a number of implications for the industry. In the
simplest sense, any ship operating company would then have to dedicate some portion of their
manpower to monitoring their fleet's emissions, ensuring compliance to regulation, and also
trading excess allowances or acquiring additional allowances. This responsibility would likely
scale with the size of the company. For instance, a small company might only require minimal
additional time from existing personnel whereas a very large company, with many ships, might
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need to create new positions dedicated to emissions management. This issue is also noted in
the Cost to Ship Owners and Operators section below.
Aside from the direct cost to ship owners and operators, the administering party for this
system would also require substantial financial support. At this stage of development, it is
difficult to accurately speculate on these costs. However, revenue from a market-based system
could be used to support administration of the system. Thus, while credit or allowance prices
may be dictated by market demand, administrative costs would likely have a role in
transactional fees for the system. To facilitate transactions in this market, it is likely, if not
certain, that third-party brokers would emerge. This adds another piece to the infrastructure
development as well as additional fees associated with transactions. These issues will require
further consideration as the details of the system evolve and better financial forecasts are
made.
6.5 Cost to Ship Owners and Operators
As with many of the major issues in this chapter, it is quite difficult to predict the fine
details at this point. However, it would be naive not to realize that a market-based system will
bring added cost to ship owners and operators. This is especially true during the startup of the
system where the fine details will still be malleable and while the learning curve is steep. As
mentioned in the previous section about infrastructure, the severity of financial strain placed
on owners and operators will likely take on some trend of direct proportionality to the fleet
size. Other factors that could affect expenses are the age of the fleet and condition of
equipment as well as trade patterns and operational conditions. These are parameters which
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could drive the emissions levels of the fleet and ultimately dictate the penalties a company
incurs. So, the cost to operators can be thought of in terms of two major categories: internal
management of emissions and the actual 'cost' of emitting (where the 'cost' of emitting could
actually be profit should emissions levels be lower than the allowed level). The next section,
Tradeoff Considerations, discusses how these costs may affect ship building, equipment
conditions, trade patterns, and operating parameters. Lastly, some cost speculation from a
presentation by the Chemical and Air Pollution Prevention Section of the IMO's Marine
Environment Division place some stamp of magnitude on the costs associated with current
emissions levels [53]. From this presentation
Table 9: CO2 Emissions from Ships in 2007 [53]
Million tonnes
Total Inventory 1019
Domestic/Fishing -176
International Shipping 843
High Estimate: 1052 Assessed uncertainty >+/- 20%
Low Estimate: 682 May Improve with better activity data
Table 10: Estimated Growth [53]
Thus, using the EU ETS carbon price of €19/million tonne (October 2008 [53]) or about
$23 US (1 = just over $1.2 US in October 2008 [8]), the total 'cost' of emissions from
international shipping in 2007 would have been about $19.4B US.
6.6 Tradeoff Considerations
This study has identified four major tradeoffs that must not be neglected in the
development of a market-based system. These tradeoffs are as follows:
* Tradeoff between NOx/SOx emissions and CO2 emissions
* Tradeoff between burning higher-grade fuel and manufacturing higher-grade
fuel
* Tradeoff between life cycle analysis (including building and scrapping) of new
ships vs. improved operational performance
* Tradeoff between shipping regulations and modal share in cargo movement
Especially with the recent work done and regulation passed for NOx and SOx emissions,
it is important to consider how NOx/SOx reduction is interrelated to the reduction of CO2
emissions. During the formation of MARPOL Annex VI, the revised version of which goes into
effect on July 1St, 2010 [15], this tradeoff was considered. Annex VI focuses on NOx/SOx
emissions, however, and though the issue was considered, no consensus was reached in terms
of quantitative analysis. One complication in this evaluation is that continuously evolving
technology is constantly changing the technical parameters of the analysis. Apart from the rest
of the technical analysis, it is certain that human health is paramount and takes precedent over
ecological concerns.
While burning better fuel (more refined) definitely has potential to improve NOx and
SOx emissions from ships, the counterpart is that this benefit must be balanced with the
negative impact resulting from the manufacturing of more refined fuels. Simply stated, if more
pollution is emitted during the land-based manufacturing process than is saved by ships burning
the better fuel, there is still a net negative impact on the environment. With that said, in the
shipping industry, a lot of reduction in emissions can be achieved for a relatively low price. This
is in part due to the low quality of residual fuel that is currently burned. It should also be noted
that some analysis has been done to compare the ship vs. land-based savings; however, these
efforts have focused on the cost of building new refineries rather than considering the benefit
of upgrading existing facilities. At this point, there is no evident consensus on this issue.
In a similar sense to the previous issues, consideration, but not much analysis has been
done to include the full life cycle of the ship. If ships are slowed down to emit less CO2, more
ships will be needed. In particular, each ship will require construction and scrapping; these
issues must be included when accurately evaluating the overall efficiency performance of a
ship. Again, if more CO2 is emitted during the production of a highly-efficient ship than is saved
during the operation of that ship, there could still be a net negative impact on the environment.
To draw an analogy, this is similar to the popular argument that more harm is done in
manufacturing some hybrid cars, such as the Toyota Prius, than is regained by its operational
benefits (this is not a proven fact, but rather a debatable argument subject to the method in
which the analysis is carried out). Aside from the ship vs. land tradeoff, this opens the door to
an entirely new set of dynamic considerations for ship owners when building new vessels.
When an owner decides to build a new ship, he/she will want to optimize its design for
performance in a certain trade. For instance, if the ship will become part of a trade loop with
two existing ships, the design may be optimized to a certain speed which is dictated by the
destinations in the trade loop and the speed of the existing ships. This is particularly important
because the natural instinct for operators is to slow down their ships to achieve better
efficiency. Intuitively, if the ships are operating at reduced speeds, additional ships may be
required to maintain the same trade schedule. This also gives rise to the question of how much
decrease in speed is possible without leaving the engine's window of efficiency. In terms of
new build considerations, one must recognize the importance of fleet interdependence for
optimization scenarios.
The fourth major consideration is the regulation of various transport modes and the
impact of biased regulation on the modal split of cargo movement. As regulation for the
shipping industry is developed, the regulation of other industries must be considered so as to
avoid creating an unfair attraction towards one mode of transportation versus another. For
instance, if shipping regulations are so harsh that it becomes more economic to move cargo by
truck (where possible), this could potentially create an unnatural shift in mode share. This
concern is particularly relevant to smaller, specialized markets such as the Great Lakes region in
the United States. Currently this argument is alive in Europe, but lacks a very thorough analysis.
6.7 Maritime ETS Considerations
Intellectually, many seem to support the concept of an emissions trading scheme for the
marine industry. However, from a practical standpoint, those same supporters don't yet have
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answers to some of the fundamental, but daunting issues (like the ones addressed above).
Another large question, perhaps with an easier answer, is whether the system should be open
or closed. An open system would have the ability to interact with other industries whereas a
closed system would be exclusive to the shipping community. Reasoning based on the overall
goal of global CO2 emissions reduction suggests that an open system is more logical. How could
real reduction be achieved if only certain players participate? However, in all practicality, it is
unreasonably optimistic to think that a global system can start in an instant. Thus, a maritime
ETS would almost inevitably begin as a closed system.
Another issue requiring further consideration is the allocation of credits. As this study
has noted, this can be done (and has been done in other industries) in a few different ways.
Allowances could be allocated based on historical trends and a target reduction, they could be
partially allocated against a pre-determined baseline, or they could be entirely auctioned.
Regardless of the method chosen, careful attention must be paid to avoid the implications of
political bias amongst member countries. Also, and particularly in the all-auctioned case, some
provisions must be taken to protect new entrants. In general, a maritime ETS poses the risk of
hindering growth and/or creating prohibitive conditions for new entrants if administration,
allocation, auctioning etc. is not properly designed for the system.
6.8 Design and Operational Index Issues
In comparison to the other issues identified in this study, CO2 design and operational
indices have already undergone significant discussion and progress through the IMO MEPC.
Previously mentioned, the IMO has agreed upon interim guidelines for the Energy Efficiency
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Design Index (EEDI). The Energy Efficiency Operational Index is currently under further work to
be reported on at the 59t h MEPC session in July 2009. In terms of these indices, more people
are comfortable with the concept of a design index than of an operational index. This is quite
possibly why the design index has seen more rapid progression. The remainder of the work for
developing the design index lies in fine tuning the formula. On the contrary, not many people
seem to be as comfortable with the operational index. This is because an operational index is
subject to an infinitely variable set of parameters. Actual conditions, for example heavy
weather, can affect this index.
At this point, it is not certain how the design or operational indices will be used or if
they will be incorporated into a market-based system. Regardless of their specific use, the
difference between inherent (design) efficiency and actual efficiency must be acknowledged.
The design efficiency is analogous to the published 'efficiencies' in the automotive industry
where we understand that the actual efficiency will vary. In this case, the design index may be
suitable for use in future design standards; however, this would require further discussion and
is merely speculation at this point.
6.9 Conclusions
At present, because there has not yet been consensus on which type of system to
implement, the generic issues are arguably more urgent for consideration. These issues have
been put into a loose timeframe perspective in Chapter 8.0, Recommendations, of this study.
As has been a recurring theme in this study, this chapter has provided additional insight into
the numerous and continually-evolving issues associated with initiating a new system.
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However, the largest and most critical issue, particularly at this stage of discussion, is creating a
meaningful system vs. political satisfaction (considered in Section 6.2).
7.0 Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Conclusions
This study has investigated a market-based approach for improving ship air emissions.
This has been done in three very distinct segments of the report: First, existing systems for
other industries, including land-based and aviation, were considered. Next, existing and
proposed systems for the shipping industry were looked at. Lastly, a number of issues, mostly
higher-level issues, were identified for consideration during the current development of a
maritime system. The study progressed using the fundamental definition of a market-based
system to be: a system which implements economic incentives to prompt or stimulate some
reduction in air emissions. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, stemming from the work of the United
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (1992), called for signatories to actively
begin reducing CO2 emissions. However, due to the complexity added by its international
nature, the shipping industry (as well the aviation industry), was excluded from the initial call to
action. With that said, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) had been considering the
issue for some time and intends to implement a framework for GHG emissions reductions prior
to the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period in 2011. It should also be noted that at
present, there is significant pressure being put on the IMO to act prior to the European Union
initiating its own measures.
Chapter 2: Evaluation of Market-Based Systems Applied to Other Industries identified a
number of systems currently in use to reduce CO2 emissions. Amongst these systems, the
European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) arguably has the greatest scope and has
potential for real reduction and lasting effect. Further, it appears that the aviation industry is
largely in consensus that joining with the EU ETS is the most reasonable course of action. The
details of this system are not yet fully developed. In particular, the administrative and
transactional costs are unknown.
This study also identified some systems which are used on a smaller scale within the
maritime industry to promote improvement ship air emissions reductions. Systems like the
Port of Long Beach/Port of Los Angeles Green Flag Program have demonstrated their
acceptance (within the community) and success, but are confined in scope to localized
application. Next, the current work within the IMO's Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC) was considered, and the report investigated the potential of an emissions
trading scheme for the shipping industry, the use of a CO2 indexing scheme, and the use of an
alternative or hybrid system. To put these notions into perspective with each other, an ETS and
alternative/hybrid systems are current rivals of debate within the shipping community while
the CO2 index has developed simultaneously alongside. At the MEPC 58th session in October of
2008, IMO developed guidelines for an energy efficiency design index (EEDI) and an energy
efficiency operational index (EEOI), an efficiency management plan for ships, and a voluntary
code for best practice in energy-efficient operation [15]. While additional work in 2009 is
expected to bring further progress of the EEOI, interim guidelines for the EEDI calculations were
issued for trial use and will be subject to ongoing refinement.
In addition to the CO2 indices, IMO will further discuss market-based systems in early
2009 and report to the MEPC 5 9 th session in July 2009. The work done at the July meeting will
subsequently be presented at the United Nations conference in Copenhagen during December
of 2009. Throughout the upcoming months and into the next couple of years, IMO must
continue to show that substantial progress is being made towards reducing greenhouse gases
from ship emissions. It is also critical that the shipping community work towards incorporating
developing countries into the proposed system by the 2012 Copenhagen meeting (when the
Kyoto Protocol expires). During this time, IMO will remain under the pressure of the EU (see
Figure 4: Potential EU Timeline). This study has shown that an independent or an integrated
emissions trading scheme for the shipping industry has potential for establishing meaningful
and real reduction in CO2 emissions from ships. Further, some ship owners favor integrating
shipping into an economy-wide ETS. This is because shipping is relatively efficient, so ship
owners would be net sellers of credits. However, since current discussions are for closed
systems, ship owners would not gain such an advantage. Furthermore, developing and
implementing an emissions trading scheme for the maritime industry will prove to be a slow
process as it is heavily burdened with infrastructure issues. It would certainly require a very
patient transition. With that said, it would put the shipping industry on par with the efforts
being taken in other parts of the world and in other industries.
Instead of an ETS, an alternative or hybrid approach could offer some different benefits,
but also comes with its own set of challenging developmental issues. There is significant
support for the implementation of a fuel bunker levy type system. Arguably the strongest
argument in favor of this type of system is that the revenue from the taxes could be used for
research and development of new technology for sustainable, environmentally-conscious
shipping. There are a few major issues with this idea. First, the infrastructure needed to
administer, manage the system, and re-invest revenue in technology would be substantial.
Also, as mentioned earlier, the system would need to carefully consider how to establish a net
reduction in emission while avoiding a simple price increase and absorption within the industry.
One idea that could make a hybrid levy system more feasible is to incorporate an incentivized
reduction schedule. For instance, the first year of emissions would be recorded and taxed. The
next year, however, taxes would be assessed at the normal rate for all emissions of equal or
lesser quantity than the previous year, and any excess emissions would be subject to a greater
tax rate.
Regardless of the chosen approach, this study has illustrated that there is a whole slew
of higher-level issues and tradeoffs that will require much additional consideration prior to
implementation. With regard to establishing a system capable of real reduction in emissions, it
is critical that the developing countries be incorporated in the system at some level. This
means that ongoing discussions for market-based systems must challenge the notion of
common, but differentiated responsibility. Further, the infrastructure needs for a new system
are great. These range from administering and enforcing the system to establishing and
maintaining a market to the potential need for new monitoring equipment aboard vessels. The
extent of these additional infrastructure needs, as well as the associated costs, is not yet
understood. Certainly these needs will translate directly into increased operational costs for
vessel operators. Other costs, such as transactional costs and the actual pricing of emissions
are not yet understood either. The study also identified a handful of important tradeoff
considerations. These include: the interdependence and relationship between regulating
NOx/JSOx emissions and CO2 emissions, the balance between burning higher-grade fuel and
increased effort in land-based refineries, lifecycle considerations including building and
scrapping of the vessel as well as slowing down ships to reduce emissions and the associated
potential need for more ships to maintain trade patterns, and the modal share of cargo
movement. A recurring theme amongst these tradeoffs is that a meaningful system for the
shipping industry is not possible without considering how it will interact and interface within
the broader context of global system for the reduction of emissions from all sources world-
wide. In general, there has been a lack of attention paid to this interaction. Discussions within
the shipping industry have primarily (if not exclusively) considered the maritime community as
an isolated entity. With such potentially massive investments in time, infrastructure, and
operating expenses, it is important that the shipping industry understands the long-term
potential and implications of its system within a much larger global effort.
Up to this point the shipping industry, via the IMO, has shown adequate consideration,
discussion, and development of CO2 reducing measures to maintain control of the issue.
However, under the pressure of the European Union and alongside the progress in other
industries, the shipping industry must soon demonstrate that it has developed and is ready to
implement a meaningful tool to responsibly regulate CO2 emissions. As this study has
indicated, some of the smaller steps that have been taken have been sufficient demonstrators
of industry progress, but it is now time to prepare for and initiate an appropriate strategy that
is effective, beneficial, and worthwhile in the long run.
7.2 Recommendations
It is important that ship owners and operators recognize that the developing regulatory
work is a real issue that will significantly affect their operations in the very near future. While a
number of owners and operators are active and have been active in the development process,
some may not be aware of the complete scope of this discussion. Thus, Table 11 and Table 12
consolidate much of the information in this study into an itemized list of recommended actions
for ship owners and operators.
In general, the motivation and progress thus far are clear evidence that regulation can
be expected in the near future. Further, pressure from the EU makes it very likely that some
formal regulation will be in place, or at least proposed, sometime between 2012-2015. Thus, it
is critical that all facets of the shipping industry, from classification societies to individual
owners, remain active in the development of these regulations while they are still very
malleable. As Chapter 6.0 indicated, many large concerns remain unresolved. It is to the
advantage of the industry to thoroughly consider how possible scenarios (such as those
investigated in this study) might affect their day-to-day operations and for them to challenge
issues from their own perspective where necessary. How will this change the interaction
between shipyards, vessel owners, ship management companies, etc.? Individual companies
have the most comprehensive understanding of their own particular role within the shipping
community, and it is left to their input to insure that their needs within this system not be
overlooked. Finally, as a general recommendation to the industry, discussions regarding
market-based approaches should extend beyond the isolated impact within the maritime
community in order to fully acknowledge and contemplate the effectiveness, interaction,
tradeoffs, and the role which potential maritime systems could play within the context of a
global effort. This is true regardless of whether or not a system for the shipping industry begins
as an open or closed system.
Even during this developmental stage, there are a number of preemptive steps which
ship operators can take to ease the transition into emissions management. The first of which is
to simply remain aware of current developments and discussions. It is also useful to observe
the impact that emissions reduction efforts have had on other industries, but to recognize the
unique needs and particular complexity of the shipping industry. This study provides a solid
investigation of these issues. Also, while no consensus has been reached for the type of system
to be used, it will be helpful to participate in any of the trial guidelines which are established by
the IMO. One particular benefit to these trials is that they can be used to understand where a
vessel, or an entire fleet, stands relative to other vessels and fleets by comparing against other
collected data. This comparison could be an exceptionally valuable indicator of relative future
expense implications. It could also provide insight and perspective for long-term strategic
planning for operators. Along these lines, it is also useful to upgrade technology as appropriate,
but to recognize that such modernization may help, but likely not provide exemption from
future regulations. Lastly, while absolute expenses are not yet understood, it is reasonable to
prepare for some level of increased operational expenses. These costs will likely scale directly
with the size of the fleet and the age of the vessels and equipment. The above-mentioned
steps towards emissions management are itemized below in Table 12.
Table 11: Recommended Actions for Ship Operators: Timeline
March 2009: Intersessional GHG Working Group Meeting
July 2009: IMO MEPC 5 9 th Session
December 2009: United Nations Conference on Climate Change - Copenhagen
2012: Kyoto Protocol Expires
Table 12: Recommended Actions for Ship Operators: Considerations
* Keep management team familiar with current developments (and up to date on
background info)
* Observe how market-based CO 2 reduction tools have affected other industries
(continue to monitor aviation industry)
* Participate in trial guidelines both to ease the learning curve and offer critical
feedback
* Understand where your fleet compares to other ships (check against reported
data for trial use)
* Upgrade technology where practical, but don't assume that this will result in
exemption (even for developing countries)
* Brace for some degree of increased operational costs as well as management
costs (particularly for large fleets and/or fleets with older vessels and engines)
* Consider opportunities that exist (such as trading credits) both internal to fleet
or externally and how these interactions may be affected by final regulations
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